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Abstract 
 
This  paper  analyzes  the  effect  of  a  woman’s  electoral  victory  on  women’s  subsequent 
political participation. Using the regression discontinuity afforded by close elections between 
women and men in India’s state elections, we find that a woman winning office leads to a 
large and significant increase in the share of female candidates from major political parties in 
the  subsequent  election.  This  stems  mainly  from  an  increased  probability  that  previous 
women candidates contest again, an important margin in India where a substantial number 
of  incumbents  do  not  contest  re-election.  There  is  no  significant  entry  of  new  female 
candidates,  no  change  in  female  or  male  voter  turnout  and  no  spillover  effects  to 
neighboring  areas.  Further  analysis  points  to  a  reduction  in  party  bias  against  women 
candidates as the main mechanism driving the observed increase in women’s candidacy.  
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1.  Introduction  
A recent literature suggests that women’s political representation influences policy 
choices in their favor (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Rehavi 2007, Miller 2008, Iyer et al. 
2012,  Bhalotra  and  Clots-Figueras  forthcoming,  Brollo  and  Troiano  2012).
1  However, 
women continue to be under-represented in political office across the world, accounting for 
only 21.4% of the membership of national parliaments globally. In 2013, women comprised 
11% of India’s national legislators, 18% of the members of the United States Congress and 
22%  of  the  United  Kingdom’s  House  of  Commons.  Many  explanations  have  been  put 
forward to explain the gender gap in executive positions in finance, business and politics. 
These include gender discrimination, the lack of female role models, women’s distaste for 
competitive environments, lower ambition of women, family responsibilities, social norms 
and  poor  negotiation  skills.
2  However,  we  know  surprisingly  little  about  the  effects  of 
exposure to women who are competitively selected into leadership positions, although there 
is  a  recent  body  of  work  exploring  the  impact of  women  entering  politics  through  the 
intervention of quotas (see below).  
In  this  paper  we  investigate  whether  women’s  political  candidacy  and  electoral 
turnout  respond  to  the  “demonstration  effects”  of  women  winning  office.  Since 
constituencies in which women win may be different in terms of voter preferences or other 
characteristics from constituencies in which women lose, we use a regression discontinuity 
design  that  involves comparing  future  candidacy and turnout in  constituencies in which 
women won in close elections against men with those in which women lost in close elections 
against men. Exposure to women politicians may lead party leaders and voters to alter their 
priors regarding women in leadership and executive roles, or women leaders may serve as 
role models to stimulate other women’s engagement in politics. We analyze a stylized model 
of  political  candidacy  and  test  its  implications  to  identify  the  role  of  these  alternative 
mechanisms. 
                                                 
1  See  Duflo  (2012)  for  a  review  of  the  relationship  between  women’s  empowerment  and  economic 
development. 
2 See, among others, Bertrand and Hallock (2001), Wolfers (2006) and Bertrand (2009) on the gender gap 
among  business  executives.  Babcock  and  Laschever  (2003)  focus on  women’s  reluctance  to  negotiate 
higher  salaries  and  promotions,  and  Bertrand,  Goldin  and  Katz  (2010)  highlight  the  role  of  career 
interruptions and fertility decisions in the business careers of MBA students. Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) discuss the role of women’s preferences, particularly for avoiding 
highly competitive environments. 3 
 
India is the largest democracy in the world, with very competitive elections involving 
more  than  700  million  voters  and  100  political  parties.  Despite  India’s  rapid  economic 
growth  and  modernization  in  recent  decades,  women  remain  disadvantaged  in  many 
domains, including survival, health and education. In 2011, there were only 940 women for 
every 1000 men and only 65% of women were literate, compared with 82% of men. Women 
are also significantly under-represented in Indian politics, comprising only 5.5% of state 
legislators over the period 1980-2007. Over the same period, only 4.4% of candidates were 
women, suggesting that candidacy is an important barrier to women holding political office. 
Women’s voter turnout has also consistently lagged behind that of men, at 59% compared 
with 66% and to the extent that women vote for “descriptive representatives,” this too may 
act to limit the share of women in government.  
Our main findings are as follows. First, the electoral victory of a woman results in a 
large and significant increase of 9.2 percentage points in the fraction of female candidates 
fielded by major parties in subsequent elections in the same constituency. Second, there is no 
impact on female or male voter turnout. We verify that the regression discontinuity strategy 
is valid by showing that there are no underlying discontinuities in the relationship between 
women’s  electoral  success,  constituency  characteristics  and  prior  election  outcomes.  In 
addition, winners and losers in mixed-gender races do not differ in characteristics such as 
education, age and wealth.  
The increase in women’s candidacy is driven primarily by the increased propensity of 
prior candidates to contest again; we find no significant increase in the entry of new female 
candidates. This “intensive margin” is a non-trivial margin in India where, in contrast to the 
US, incumbents do not necessarily run for re-election, and incumbents who do run have 
been shown to have an electoral disadvantage (Linden 2004, Uppal 2009). In our data, 34% 
of female winners and 28% of male winners do not run for re-election.
3  
The increase in women’s candidacy following a woman’s electoral victory is fairly 
local, being limited in time and space. There is no evidence of area spillovers: a woman’s 
electoral victory does not increase women’s candidacy in nearby constituencies. In addition, 
we find no evidence that a woman winning increases the chances that a woman wins in the 
next election. Consistent with this, the candidacy effect fades with time since the event of a 
                                                 
3 There are no term limits in Indian elections. 4 
 
woman winning, from a 9.2 percentage point increase in the next election to a 4.2 percentage 
point increase in the election after that.   
In  order  to  gain  insight  into  the  relative  importance  of  alternative  mechanisms 
driving the relationship between a woman winning political office and subsequent increases 
in the share of women candidates, we present a stylized model of political candidacy closely 
related to that in Casas-Arce and Saiz (2011). We use it to generate predictions that help us 
discriminate  between  a  decrease  in  bias  against  women  on  the  part  of  party  leaders,  a 
decrease in voter bias against women candidates, and an increase of the supply of potential 
women  candidates.  We  argue  that  the  evidence  points to  a  reduction  in  party  bias.  To 
discriminate between party and voter bias, we exploit the model’s prediction that a reduction 
in party bias would lead to increases in women’s candidacy from the incumbent party alone 
but a reduction of voter bias is expected to lead to increases in women’s candidacy across 
parties. Studying the vote share of new women candidates allows us to discriminate between 
a reduction in party bias (which would lower the ability threshold for entry of women) and 
the entry of more qualified women. To further investigate the role of candidate supply, we 
exploit the staggered implementation of quotas for women in local government that led to a 
massive expansion in the number of women with some experience of political office.  
We find that the increase in women’s candidacy after a woman wins is unique to the 
incumbent party, is  associated with a reduction in the vote share of new women, and is no 
larger in elections that occur after the pool of women in local government expands. There is 
hence little evidence that reduction in voter bias or entry of more qualified women drive the 
results, consistent with our initial findings of no significant increase in voter turnout or entry 
of new women. We also find that female election winners are significantly more likely to run 
for re-election from the same party, compared to male winners, suggesting that winning 
improves the intra-party environment for women more than for men. 
Our paper makes two substantive advances to the literature on women’s political 
participation. First, analysis of women’s candidacy and turnout is scarce in the economics 
literature, especially in a competitive setting. While a few recent studies analyze the effects of 
electoral quotas on women’s candidacy and winning chances, the implementation of quotas 
may introduce distortions, such as changing candidate quality for both women and men 
(Besley et al. 2012, Bardhan et al. 2010, Deininger and Nagarajan 2011), creating a backlash 
against  female  leaders  (Gagliarducci  and  Paserman  2011)  or  strengthening  taste-based 5 
 
discrimination  (Boisjoly  et  al.  2006,  Beaman  et  al.  2009).  Moreover,  it  is  unclear  that 
affirmative action in general eliminates negative stereotypes (Coate and Loury 1993). The 
evidence on the success of quotas in increasing women’s political representation is mixed in 
general (see Pande and Ford 2011 for a review, also see Eggers 2011, Campa 2012, Bagues 
and Esteve-Volart 2012) and has been debated in the case of India.
4 For these reasons, it is 
important  to  identify  the  extent  to  which a  spontaneous  dynamic  operates  in  launching 
women into the political sphere when quotas are absent.  
Our  second  contribution  is  that  we  analyze  three  plausible  barriers  to  women’s 
candidacy in a given setting, implementing tests that allow some discrimination between 
them. Most papers focus on documenting the existence of one specific mechanism. For 
instance, Beaman et al (2009) document a decline in statistical discrimination against women 
after  men  are  exposed  to  women  leaders  through  quotas,  but  no  decline  in  taste-based 
discrimination; they do not attempt to examine mechanisms such as party bias (given that 
they look at local elections in which political party participation is restricted in many states) 
or  the  entry  of  new  women  into  politics.  Lawless  and  Fox  (2010)  conduct  surveys  of 
potential women candidates in the US, and document several factors which make women 
less likely to perceive themselves as viable candidates, but do not examine the role of voter 
bias or party bias.  A notable exception is Casas-Arce and Saiz (2011), who consider several 
potential mechanisms. Using Spanish election data before and after the implementation of 
gender  quotas,  they  find  that  parties  sacrifice  vote  share  rather  than  nominate  female 
candidates, an indication of party bias against women.  
  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  2  provides  relevant 
background on the Indian political system, Section 3 describes our empirical strategy, and 
Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 outlines a simple theoretical framework for 
candidate selection, Section 6 provides empirical evidence to distinguish between alternative 
mechanisms, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
                                                 
4 Beaman et al. (2009) find that women are significantly more likely to stand for and win elected positions 
in  village  councils  in  West  Bengal  if  the  post  of  chief  councilor  was  reserved  for  a  woman  in  two 
consecutive preceding elections. There are no significant impacts after one election period, in fact voter 
evaluations of women leaders deteriorate after one term of exposure. Bhavnani (2009) finds increases in 
women’s candidacy and winning chances in reserved constituencies in Mumbai after quotas are lifted, but a 
subsequent re-analysis shows much weaker results, most likely because of the “discouragement” of women 
candidates in areas that were not subject to quotas (Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012). 6 
 
2.  Women in Indian Politics  
 
2.1  Indian Electoral Politics 
India is the world’s largest democracy, with a parliamentary system of government at 
both the central and state levels. Elections are held every five years, on a first-past-the-post 
system  in  single-member  constituencies.  States  may  occasionally  hold  midterm  elections, 
before the five-year term of the government expires, if the governing coalition loses the 
confidence of the majority of the state legislature and an alternative government cannot be 
formed.  
We  focus  on  elections  to  state  legislatures.  In  India’s  federal  system,  state 
governments are responsible for several development policy areas including law and order, 
health  and  education.  State  level  parties  play  a  significant  role  in  forming  governing 
coalitions at the center, and previous research has shown that state-level voting behavior is 
highly correlated with voting in national elections (Ravishankar, 2009). Further, since state-
level political office is often a stepping stone for contesting national elections, our work 
captures the dynamics of female participation at the “pipeline” stage for national office. 
There are currently no quotas for women in state or national level elections. A one-
third quota for women in district and village level councils was mandated by a constitutional 
amendment in 1993.
5 In March 2010, a bill proposing to enact a one-third quota for women 
in national and state legislatures was passed by the upper house of parliament, but it has not 
yet been voted on in the lower house, making the analysis in this paper highly topical.  
In India’s political system, party leaders decide who their candidate will be in every 
constituency. There are no primaries as in the United States, and the process of choosing 
candidates is not transparent. We conducted interviews with politicians from several Indian 
political parties to understand the candidate selection process. In general, it was described as 
follows: parties draw up an initial short list of 2-5 candidates from each constituency, and 
then  embark  on  information  gathering  exercises,  including  third-party  voter  surveys,  to 
assess candidate quality. The main candidate quality emphasized by all parties was the ability 
to win the election, termed “winnability” in Indian politics. To this end, several metrics 
                                                 
5 The impact of this reform has been examined in several recent papers including Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
(2004), Beaman et al (2009) and Iyer et al (2012). Political quotas exist at that state and national levels for 
members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; Pande (2003) and Krishnan (2007) examine the 
policy impact of these quotas. 7 
 
including the candidate’s name recognition within the constituency, service to the party, 
financial  resources,  caste  identity  and  internal  party  support  were  considered  relevant. 
Interestingly, very few party leaders felt that women voters were more likely to vote for 
women candidates, though several expressed the view that women were less interested in 
politics than men, and that a political career was not attractive to women. 
 
2.2 Data Sources 
We obtained data on elections to state legislative assemblies in 3473 constituencies 
from the Election Commission of India over the period 1980-2007 in which most states had 
six elections. Electoral constituency boundaries remained fixed through this period, so we do 
not have to worry about concerns such as gerrymandering which might differentially affect 
the  electoral  prospects  for  women.  We  have  information  on  the  name,  gender,  party 
affiliation and votes obtained by every candidate as well as gender-specific voter turnout by 
constituency. We use data for the 16 major states of India which account for over 95% of 
the total population.
6 We obtained relevant demographic data (literacy, urbanization) at the 
constituency level from the 2001 census.
7 
We  tracked  candidates  by  name  over  successive  elections  to  identify  whether 
candidates  in  a  specific  election  were  present  in  the  previous  election.
8  Overall,  in  our 
sample, three-quarters of all candidates did not contest the previous election i.e. are “new” 
candidates. Systematic data on candidate attributes are available only after 2004, when the 
Election Commission made it mandatory for all candidates to file affidavits giving details of 
their  age,  education,  asset  ownership  and  any  pending  criminal  charges.  We  have  this 
information for candidates in 14 out of 16 states, which held elections between 2004 and 
2007. Compared to male candidates, women candidates are on average three years younger, 
less likely to have completed high school, and less likely to have any criminal charges filed 
against them (summary statistics available upon request). In examining the validity of our 
                                                 
6 The states included are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West 
Bengal. In 2001, three new states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand were carved out of the larger 
states  of  Bihar,  Madhya  Pradesh  and  Uttar  Pradesh  respectively.  For  the  first  two  states,  electoral 
constituency  boundaries  remained  fixed  over  time,  and  we  drop  the  data  from  the  Uttarakhand  state 
elections of 2002 and 2007 since we are unable to match the electoral constituencies over time. 
7 We thank Rikhil Bhavnani and Sandip Sukhtankar for sharing these data with us. 
8 Candidate names are often spelt differently across elections and candidates often change party affiliations 
too. We therefore did a case by case manual matching of candidate names over time. 8 
 
regression discontinuity strategy, we will verify that none of these characteristics vary across 
winners and losers in close elections.  
 
2.3 Women’s Political Participation in State Elections 
Women are dramatically under-represented in India’s state legislatures. As mentioned 
earlier, only 5.5% of state legislators were women, but only 4.4% of candidates were women. 
Almost 70% of electoral races had no female candidates at all, and only 7% of races had 
more than one woman candidate. While showing a secular increase over our sample period, 
women’s participation varied dramatically across states. For instance, in 2000-2007, the share 
of female candidates from major parties varied from almost 13% in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh to only 4% in the neighboring state of Karnataka (Figure 1). Major parties in general 
are more rather than less likely to nominate women candidates, with 5.6% of their candidates 
being women.
9  
There is no a priori evidence that women avoid more competitive races. In fact, 
electoral races in which a female candidate is present tend to have larger electorates and a 
greater number of candidates. In 2013, only four out of forty major parties in India were 
headed  by  women.  These  parties  have  a  slightly  higher  share  of  female  candidates,  7% 
compared to the 5% share for major parties not headed by women. Women are less likely 
than men to contest elections again, irrespective of whether or not they win. Only 66% of 
female winners and 31% of female runners-up contest the next election, compared to 72% 
of male winners and 40% of male runners-up.  
State elections in India are competitive. In our data, the mean (median) number of 
candidates per constituency is ten (eight). Of these, only 34% (2.6 candidates on average) are 
from major political parties and only 3 candidates on average manage to obtain more than 5 
percent of the total votes, suggesting that the majority of candidates in India’s electoral races 
are not politically viable. In the analysis to follow, we therefore consistently present results 
separately  for  major  party  candidates  and  competitive  candidates  in  order  to  focus  on 
candidates who are politically meaningful.
10  
                                                 
9 We classify a party as a “major party” in a state if the party won more than 5 percent of the seats in the 
state in any year. 
10 There is a strong overlap between these categories. The vast majority (88%) of major party candidates 
are  competitive  in  the  sense  of  obtaining  at  least  5%  of  total  votes  cast.  Similarly,  about  73%  of 
competitive candidates belong to a major party.  9 
 
 
3.  Identifying  the  Effects  of  Women’s  Electoral  Success:  The  Regression 
Discontinuity Design   
  We are interested in how indicators of women’s political participation at the electoral 
constituency level respond to a woman having won the previous election. The identification 
problem  is  that  a  woman’s  political  victory  might  be  correlated  with  unobserved 
characteristics  such  as  voter  preferences,  which  might  directly  determine  women’s 
participation  as  voters  and  candidates  in  subsequent  elections.  We  address  this  problem 
using a regression discontinuity (RD) estimator, which focuses on mixed-gender electoral 
races  decided  by  a  very  narrow  margin.  Treatment  assignment  depends  on  the  running 
variable, the vote margin between a woman and a man. The probability of a woman winning 
an election exhibits a sharp discontinuity when this vote margin is zero, since the candidate 
with the most votes wins, irrespective of how close the runner up stands.
11 The identifying 
assumption is that the assignment of treatment around the threshold is uncorrelated with any 
observed  or  unobserved  characteristics  of  the  candidate  or  the  constituency  i.e.  that 
constituencies  in  which  women  win  in  close  elections  against  men  are  similar  to 
constituencies in which women lose narrowly against men, except for the gender of the 
winning candidate.
12 The estimated model is of the form: 
 
(1)  Yist = a + b WomanWonis,t-1 + f(Mis,t-1) +  eist 
 
Yist is a measure of female political participation for constituency i in state s in year t. We 
focus upon the share of women candidates (overall and among major parties) and female 
voter turnout but we also look at the competitiveness of women candidates and at male 
turnout. The sample is restricted to elections in which a man and a woman were among the 
                                                 
11 See Lee (2008) for the seminal use of the regression discontinuity design using electoral data. Studies 
which  use  close  elections  between  men  and  women  include  Rehavi  (2007),  Clots-Figueras  (2011  and 
2012), Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (forthcoming) and Broockman (2012). 
12 We thus implicitly test whether winning matters discontinuously, that is, significantly more than a good 
electoral performance which falls short of winning (captured by woman being close runners-up in the 
“control  group”  of  constituencies  in  which  women  lose  close  elections  against  men).  Using  an  OLS 
specification, we later verify that having a woman as runner-up has no additional effect on future female 
candidacy. 10 
 
top two vote-getters
13 and Mis,t-1 is defined as the margin of victory between the female and 
the male politician in the previous election in the constituency. WomanWonis,t-1 is a dummy 
which equals one if a woman won against a man (Mis,t-1 >0) and zero if a woman lost against 
a man (Mis,t-1 <0). The parameter b captures the causal impact of this event on women’s 
participation as candidates and voters in the next election.  
So as to increase our confidence that we estimate the impact of  the discontinuity that 
determines  winning  rather  than  an  underlying  non-linearity  in  the  relationship  between 
participation (Y) and the vote margin (M), we fit a flexible function of the vote margin,  
f(Mis,t-1),  on  either  side  of  the  discontinuity,  using  second-order  polynomials  (e.g.  Lee, 
Moretti  and  Butler  2004).  We  show  that  our  results  are  robust  to  adding  higher-order 
polynomials.  We  also  estimate  local  linear  regressions  (Hahn  et  al,  2001;  Imbens  and 
Lemieux, 2007), restricting the sample to an optimal bandwidth around the discontinuity, 
with the optimal bandwidth selected by applying the method in Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2011). Finally, we investigate robustness to using a “discontinuity sample”, restricting the 
sample to a very small bandwidth around the discontinuity and testing the differences in 
means on both sides of the discontinuity (Angrist and Lavy, 1999). 
To investigate area spillovers, we replace the dependent variable in (1) with an indicator 
of women’s political participation in constituencies other than the index constituency i, but 
within  the  same  administrative  district  (which  typically  consists  of  9-10  electoral 
constituencies). To examine persistence in the relationship of interest, we estimate equation 
(1) replacing the first lag with longer lags, first the second, then the third lag. These provide 
reduced form estimates of how women’s participation in election t responds to a woman 
having won in election t-2 or t-3 (ten and fifteen years ago), respectively, implicitly averaging 
over the gender of the winner in intervening elections.  
While regression discontinuity estimates are likely to satisfy internal validity conditions, 
they may or may not have external validity. In particular, the relationship that we identify 
may not hold in constituencies that do not have close elections between men and women. In 
the appendix, we report OLS estimates of a panel data specification run on the universe of 
elections: 
 
                                                 
13  The  top  two  vote-getters  in  mixed  gender  races  get  on  average  81%  of  the  total  votes  in  their 
constituencies. 11 
 
(2) Yist = ais + bt + cWomanWonis,t-1  +  uist 
 
where ais is a fixed effect for constituency i in state s and bt is a fixed effect for the election 
cycle.
14  
 
4.  Does Women’s Political Participation Respond to Prior Electoral Success? 
 
4.1 Regression Discontinuity Estimates 
We find that the event of a woman winning an election leads to a large and statistically 
significant increase of 9.2 percentage points in the share of women candidates from major 
parties in the subsequent election (Table 2, column 2). As the mean share of women among 
major party candidates is 23% in the regression discontinuity sample, this is close to a 40% 
increase.  The share of women among competitive candidates, defined as those who get at 
least 5% of total votes cast, also increases significantly (column 3). This is consistent with the 
strong  overlap  between  major  party  and  competitive  candidates.  Interestingly,  when  we 
consider all candidates, there is only a statistically insignificant increase of 1.5 percentage 
points in future female candidacy (Table 2, column 1). So the evidence rejects the notion 
that women are token candidates, the increase in candidacy that we observe following an 
electoral victory by a female politician is of politically viable women fielded by politically 
relevant parties.  
The increase in the female candidate share is not driven by a decrease in the overall 
number of candidates. Neither the total number of candidates nor the number from major 
parties changes significantly following a female electoral victory (columns 7 and 8). Instead, 
there is a substitution of female for male candidates among major parties: the number of 
female candidates increases by 0.177 and the number of male candidates decreases by 0.21, 
and these coefficients are statistically significant (columns 9 and 10).  
                                                 
14 Since elections are held every five years on average, we use the five year intervals (1980-84, 1985-89 
etc) to denote the “election cycle”. Our results remain unchanged if we include annual year dummies 
instead. Standard errors for OLS regressions are clustered at the constituency level, for RD regressions they 
are clustered at the state-electoral cycle level, given that in many constituencies there is only one election 
between a woman and a man. However, RD results with standard errors clustered at the district level are 
very similar to those reported in the paper and available on request. 
 12 
 
A visual representation of these estimates is in Figure 2B, which shows a jump in the 
major party female candidate share at the zero vote margin, to the left of which a woman 
narrowly lost the previous election and to the right of which a woman narrowly won the 
previous election against a man. The jump at the threshold is smaller for the overall share of 
female candidates (Figure 2A). 
We next examine how much of the observed rise in women’s candidacy represents entry 
of new female candidates, defined as those who did not contest the previous election. We 
find no evidence of entry: the regression coefficient for the new female share of major party 
candidates is small, negative and statistically insignificant (see Table 2, column 4 and Figure 
2C). So a woman winning raises women’s candidacy in the next election primarily through 
raising the chances that prior women candidates obtain the party nomination.  We also 
examined whether women’s participation as voters changes in response to women’s electoral 
victory. We find no significant change in female or male voter turnout (Table 2, columns 5 
and  6).  We  have  also verified that  voter  turnout  is  not  significantly  associated  with  the 
fraction  of  female  candidates  in  the  current  election  (results  available  on  request).  This 
contrasts with the finding that both black and white voters are more likely to turnout to vote 
when blacks are on the ballot in U.S. elections (Washington 2006). In addition, we find no 
significant increase in the probability that a woman wins the next election (Table 2, column 
11). 
We  present  OLS  estimates  using  all elections  in  an  appendix  (Table  A1).  The  OLS 
coefficients are similar to the RD coefficients for major party, competitive candidates, and 
for electoral turnout, if somewhat larger in magnitude (columns 1, 3, 6 and 7). However, 
OLS results are different from RD for the share of new women candidates and the overall 
share of female candidates (columns 4 and 5). We see that a woman placing as a runner-up 
in the previous election has no impact on future female candidacy, justifying our focus on 
winning (column 2).  
 
4.2. Spillovers and Persistence 
  We find no evidence of spillover effects to other constituencies within the same 
district (Table 3, column 1). This is consistent with our interviews with politicians which 
described  the  candidate  selection  process  as  being  constituency  specific:  local  name 
recognition  or  local  resources  were  a  major  determining  factor,  and  “parachuting”  in 13 
 
candidates from outside the constituency seldom happened. A related analysis of US data 
similarly  finds  no  impact  of  a  woman  being  elected  on  the  participation  of  women  in 
neighboring districts (Broockman 2012). 
The  effects  of  a  woman  winning  an  election  persist  to  the  ten  year  mark  (two 
elections later) although the marginal increase in the share of women candidates from major 
parties is reduced to just under half its size at the five year mark (a 4.2% point increase). At 
the fifteen year mark it drops to effectively zero (Table 3, columns 2 and 3), though the 
sample size declines by 23% and 40% when considering these lags. This diminishing effect is 
consistent with increased female candidacy depending upon women winning elections, and 
we saw that a woman’s victory in one election does not imply a higher probability that a 
woman wins the next election. 
 
4.3 Robustness and Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design 
 
4.3.1.   Robustness to functional form and sample for the running variable  
We conduct a series of robustness checks for the RD result that the female share of major 
party candidates in a constituency rises following a woman having won (Table 3, Panel B). 
The  baseline  specification  in  Table  2 controls  for  a  quadratic  polynomial  in  the  victory 
margin that is allowed to be different at both sides of the discontinuity; we now enrich the 
specification with controls for third and fourth order polynomials in the victory margin. The 
point estimate decreases with the order of the polynomial but is not significantly different 
from the reported baseline coefficient (Table 3, columns 4 and 5). The estimate is again 
similar  when  a  local  linear  regression  is estimated  on  a  sample  restricted  to  an  optimal 
bandwidth around the discontinuity (column 6)
15 and when the sample is restricted to a very 
narrow bandwidth of 0.05 and we effectively compare the mean of the dependent variable 
on both sides of the discontinuity (column 7). We then include state-year fixed effects which 
control for all relevant election-specific factors such as whether the previous Chief Minister 
was a woman, whether there was a woman party leader in the current election, or whether a 
new woman-headed party had been formed. Again the estimated coefficient retains its size 
and significance (column 8). 
 
                                                 
15 The optimal bandwidth is 0.24. 14 
 
4.3.2.   Continuity of the vote margin 
For  the  identification strategy  to be  valid  the  density  of the  running variable has  to be 
continuous at the threshold. Manipulation of the vote margin is unlikely in our setting, since 
the Election Commission of India has a well-established reputation of independence and 
political  neutrality,  and  Indian  elections  are  usually  considered  free  and  fair.  Following 
McCrary (2008), we formally verify that there is no significant discontinuity at the zero point; 
the estimated discontinuity is 0.0534 with a standard error of 0.0951 (see  Figures 3A and 
3B). 
 
4.3.3.  Fake or placebo discontinuities 
We tested for discontinuous increases in candidacy at points of the vote margin distribution 
at which there should be no jumps, that is, points other than zero. As suggested in Imbens 
and Lemieux (2007), we implemented a placebo check re-computing the RD estimates using 
“fake” discontinuities at the medians of the subsamples on either side of the zero vote 
margin. The coefficient of interest is much smaller and statistically insignificant (Table 4, 
Panel A). 
 
4.3.4.  Do covariates and pre-determined variables show discontinuities? 
 A virtue of the RD design is that its assumptions are testable. We verified that a range of 
demographic covariates (population gender ratios, literacy rates, urbanization rates)
16 and 
pre-determined  electoral  variables  (total  number  of  female  electors,  the  number  of 
candidates, voter turnout and the number of female candidates from major parties in the 
previous election) do not vary discontinuously at the RD threshold (Table 4, Panel B). We 
test this using our main specification and with local linear regressions run on an optimal 
bandwidth. Only one of the 26 coefficients is significant, and reassuringly, all coefficients are 
very small, which means that these variables are balanced around the discontinuity. 
   
4.3.5 Do characteristics other than gender vary discontinuously? 
 In a seminal paper, Lee (2008) investigated party incumbency advantage in the US using 
close elections between Democrats and Republicans. Recent studies (Caughey and Sekhon 
2011, Grimmer et al., 2011) have questioned the validity of the RD premise that the (party) 
                                                 
16 We used census data at the constituency level for this. 15 
 
identity of the winner is quasi-random in close elections, showing that in fact the incumbent 
party in US elections tends to have systematically greater chances of winning even when 
elections are close. However Eggers et al. (2013) argue that such sorting is unique to the US 
House in the post-war period, and find no evidence of it in several other countries including 
India.  
  We nevertheless test for sorting and find no evidence that winners and losers in close 
elections  between  women  and  men  are  significantly  different  in  a  range  of  relevant 
characteristics such as gender, education, wealth, criminal convictions, belonging to a major 
political party or being the incumbent  (Figure 4). If this were not the case, we may attribute 
to gender other characteristics of winners. Importantly, women are not more likely than men 
to win these elections (Figure 4A), and incumbents do not have an advantage in winning 
close elections (Figure 4F).
17  
 
5. A Simple Model of Candidate Choice 
  In this section, we analyze a simple model of candidacy, based on the framework of 
Casas-Arce & Saiz (2011). The model incorporates three barriers to the participation of 
women in politics: party bias, voter bias, and a tendency for women to be less willing to 
come forward as candidates than men. Women winning and holding office may lead to party 
leaders or voters revising their bias or to potential women candidates being encouraged to 
compete, so the impact of women winning on female candidacy that we have identified may 
arise  through  any  of  these  mechanisms. The  stylized  model we  present  here  is  used  to 
generate testable implications that help identify the empirical relevance of the alternative 
mechanisms.  
  In the model, there is a continuum of voters with mass 1 and their preferred policy 
outcomes are distributed uniformly along a policy continuum between 0 and 1. There are 
two parties in the model, with policy positions exogenously given at 0 and 1. We assume that 
                                                 
17 Female politicians are more likely to have family connections to other politicians than male politicians in 
India’s national parliament (French 2011) and in the US (Dal Bó et al 2009). We are unable to replicate the 
French (2011) methodology of contacting local journalists in each constituency to assess the extent of such 
connections at the local level. As French says, “It was not enough to take prominent names and make larger 
deductions from them. Equally, much of the information did not seem to exist. Only someone who worked 
at a local level, perhaps as a political journalist, would be likely to know how each MP in their area entered 
politics.”  However,  it  is  unlikely  that  family  connections  of  the  winner  matter  in  mixed-gender  close 
elections, given that we show all other observable characteristics of the winner and the runner-up to be 
similar.  16 
 
party  policy  positions  are  decided  before  candidate  selection  (assumption  A1),  so  as  to 
isolate the determinants of female candidacy.
18 This is reasonable in the Indian setting, where 
policy positions are decided by the party leadership at the state level and party nominees are 
then chosen at the constituency level. 
 
5.1 Timing of events  
There are three time periods. First, potential candidates (male and female) decide 
whether to be in contention or not, creating a pool for parties to choose from. There may be 
differences between men and women in the cost of entering politics, perhaps because of 
social norms regarding the public roles of women, because women believe the payoff to 
running is lower, or because women perceive a career in politics to be incompatible with 
family responsibilities (Lawless and Fox 2010). This means that the ability distributions of 
potential male and female candidates can be different. In the second stage, parties choose 
their nominee for each constituency, in a process described in more detail below. Finally, 
voters vote to elect candidates to power. 
 
5.2 Voters 
  Voters  care  about  policies,  candidate  ability  and  gender.  A  voter  with  preferred 
policy x ε [0,1] obtains the following utility by voting for party p ε  {0,1}: 
 
U(x,p) = C – (1/2)*λ*|p-x| + Ap – dv*Wp 
 
where C is a constant and λ measures the extent to which voters penalize deviations of party 
ideology from their own policy preference. Holding everything else constant, if λ is low, 
voters  do  not  care  a  lot  about  party  ideology  and  are  more  likely  to  switch  based  on 
candidate characteristics. Ap is the ability of party p’s candidate, Wp equals one if party p’s 
candidate is a woman and dv ≥ 0 measures the extent of voter bias against women. For 
simplicity, voter bias against women is assumed independent of the policy preferences of the 
voter. Candidates’ abilities are known to voters before they vote (assumption A2), so that 
                                                 
18  Previous  work  on  women’s  political  representation  endogenizes  policy  choice  but  does  not  model 
candidate selection (e.g. Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004).  
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voter bias is a taste discrimination parameter. However, if statistical discrimination takes the 
form of voters consistently assuming that the expected ability of women is lower than their 
actual ability, this would be observationally equivalent to voter bias in our model.
19   
Voters turn out to vote as long as the net utility of voting is higher than a reservation 
utility C of not voting. We assume that the opportunity cost of voting is low enough that all 
voters turn out to vote (assumption A3) which, in our setting, is without loss of generality 
since we find no changes in voter turnout following a woman’s electoral victory. Given the 
full turnout assumption, the equilibrium outcome is such that all voters in [0, xm] vote for 
party 0, and all voters with ideal points in [xm, 1] vote for party 1, where the marginal voter 
xm satisfies 
 
(3) xm = (1/2) + (1/ λ)* [(A0-A1) – dv (W0-W1)] 
 
Party 0 gets the vote share xm and Party 1 has vote share (1- xm). 
 
5.3 Parties 
Potential candidates vary in their ability, with ability distributions fpm and fpw for men 
and women within party p. We assume that potential candidate ability is initially unknown, 
that parties draw a random sample from the male and female candidate pool within their 
parties,  after  which  ability  is  revealed  and  then  parties  make  the  candidate  choice  that 
maximizes their utility. We assume that parties choose their party nominees simultaneously 
(assumption A4), a fair representation of the Indian political system where there are no 
official primaries to enable parties to predict the other party’s candidate choice and all parties 
have a common deadline to declare an official candidate, typically one month before the 
election. 
Parties  are  interested  in  winning  elections.  We  therefore  assume  that  they  are 
interested in maximizing their vote share,
20 but that they also discriminate against women in 
                                                 
19 Statistical discrimination could also take the form of voters assuming that the variability of women’s 
ability is larger than the variability of men’s ability (Aigner and Cain 1977). We do not model this. In our 
data, there is no significant difference in the variability of realized vote shares for men and women major 
party candidates (considering vote share as a proxy for candidate ability). In fact, vote share variability is 
slightly lower for women. Of course, vote shares are measured after candidate selection. 18 
 
a  taste-based  manner  i.e.  that  party p  experiences  a  disutility dp≥0  from  having  women 
candidates.
21  After  Party  0  obtains  candidate  ability  draws  aw0  and  am0,  it  has  to  decide 
whether to choose a man or a woman to maximize utility U
0 = xm – d0W0. Taking the 
choices of Party 1 to be given (i.e. W1 and A1 are fixed), this implies solving: 
 
Max (1/ λ)*A0 – (1/ λ)* dvW0 – d0W0 
 
Party 0 therefore chooses the woman candidate over the man if 
 
(4)               aw0> am0 + dv + λ d0  
 
A similar equation applies to party 1. So when neither parties nor voters discriminate (i.e. dv 
=0 and d0 = d1=0), parties will choose the highest ability candidate, irrespective of the 
candidate’s gender. However if either or both of political parties and voters discriminate, 
then the ability threshold for a woman candidate to be selected will be higher than that for 
male candidates.  
  Equation  (4)  captures  the  three  mechanisms  that  might  drive  a  rise  in  female 
candidacy in party 0 after a woman from that party wins an election: (a) a decline in the 
party’s disutility of having a woman candidate (d0), which is party-specific, either because the 
incumbent  woman  winner  may act  to  recruit  more  women or,  relatedly,  because  of  the 
ascendance  of  woman-friendly  factions  within  the  party.  The  latter  is  consistent  with  a 
model in which party utility is the aggregate utility of current incumbents (as in Frechette, 
Maniquet and Morelli 2008); (b) a decline in voter bias against women (dv) as voters get 
accustomed to seeing women in leadership positions, and (c) a rightward shift in the ability 
distribution  of  potential  women  candidates,  due  to  the  entry  of  more  qualified  women 
candidates. It is clear from equation (4) that if party and voter bias do not change then only a 
rightward  shift  in  the  ability  distribution  of  potential  female  candidates  can  lead  to  an 
                                                                                                                                                 
20  This  is  without  loss  of  generality,  since  winning  is  an  increasing  function  of  vote  share  with  a 
discontinuity when vote share exceeds half in a two-party setting, and a different (endogenous) threshold in 
a multi-party setting. 
21 As with voter bias, a model of statistical discrimination in which parties assume that women and men 
have different expected average ability would be observationally equivalent to this one. 
 19 
 
increase in the probability of selecting a female candidate. Using this framework we conduct 
some comparative static exercises.
22  
 
6 Testing Mechanisms 
6.1 Reduced voter bias or an intra-party mechanism? 
  A reduction in voter bias (dv) will lower the ability threshold for choosing a female 
candidate for both parties (see equation 4 above), leading us to expect to see greater female 
candidacy in both parties. On the other hand, if a woman’s victory reduces party bias against 
women or leads to greater entry of potential female candidates within the woman winner’s 
party, then the increase in female candidacy will be restricted to the party from which the 
woman won. So we are able to distinguish voter bias reduction from intra-party mechanisms 
by running the following regression: 
 
(H1) Femcand pist = a + b10*WomanWonis, t-1 + b11*WomanWonis, t-1* 
IncumbentPartypist +          +b12 f(Mis,t-1) +  b13 f(Mis,t-1) * IncumbentPartypist +  upist 
 
where Femcandpist is the probability that the candidate from party p in constituency i of 
state s and time t is a woman, WomanWonis,t-1  is a dummy which equals one if a woman 
won the last election in that constituency, and IncumbentPartypist  is a dummy which equals 
one  for  the  party  from  which  the  woman won  in  the  previous  election.
23  If  voter  bias 
reduction were the only mechanism at work, we would expect b11=0.  
The evidence rejects voter bias reduction in favor of a within-party mechanism since 
the  estimated  b11  (the  interaction  coefficient)  is  significantly  greater  than  zero  (Table  5, 
column 1). The increase in the probability that a woman candidate is fielded is unique to the 
incumbent party, there being a decline in the probability that the other party fields a woman 
candidate.. Combined with our previous result of no entry of new candidates (Table 2), this 
                                                 
22 We use the same RD design on close elections here as in the main analysis. For reference, we present 
OLS estimates on the wider sample of elections in Table A2. 
23 Note that, in the spirit of the “difference in discontinuities” methodology, see Grembi et al (2012), we 
also interact the margin and the margin polynomials with the IncumbentPartypist dummy.This allows us to 
test whether the two discontinuities (for incumbent parties and other parties) are significantly different, 
while  allowing the  margin functions  for both types  of parties  at both  sides of  the discontinuity  to  be 
different.  20 
 
means that the primary effect of electoral victory is to enable women winners to contest for 
re-election.
24  In Section 6.4, we examine whether this pattern is different for male winners.
 25  
We  now  look  to  distinguish  between  a  reduction  in  party  bias  against  female 
candidates and a rightward shift in the ability distribution of potential candidates. 
 
6.2 Reduced party bias vs the candidate supply mechanism 
In general, the change in vote share for party 0 between elections t-1 and t is given 
by: 
 
(5)     V0,t - V0,t-1 = (1/ λ)* [(A0,t-A0,t-1)  - (A1,t-A1,t-1) – dv,t (W0,t-W1,t) + dv,t-1 (W0,t-1-W1,t-1)] 
 
If more qualified women come forward within party 0 after that party has a female winner, 
we have E(A0,t  - A0,t-1) >0 provided party 0 fields a woman candidate both times. If there is 
no change in voter bias (dv,t = dv,t-1) and no change in the ability distribution in party 1 (i.e. 
E(A1,t - A1,t-1) =0), then the expected change in vote share for female candidates is positive 
i.e. E [V0,t - V0,t-1 ] > 0. Since this will not happen if the same woman runs again (A0,t  = A0,t-
1), it follows that the vote share of new female candidates will go up if new, more qualified 
women are induced to enter. On the other hand, if party bias falls, this will lower the ability 
threshold  for  women  potential  candidates  and  new  women  candidates  will  have  lower 
expected ability than before i.e. E(A0,t  - A0,t-1) <0, implying a lower vote share on average i.e. 
E [V0,t - V0,t-1 ] < 0.
26 We can discriminate between these mechanisms by estimating the 
following regression: 
 
(H2) Voteshare of new female candidatesist = a + b20WomanWonis,t-1+ b21f(Mis,t-1) + uist 
 
                                                 
24 We have verified this explicitly. When the dependent variable is changed to whether a prior female 
candidate is present in the current election, we find a very similar coefficient of 0.763 for b11. There is no 
entry of new female candidates from incumbent or other parties. 
25 Party bias against women is more likely to be exercised in less competitive environments where the cost 
of exercising bias (in terms of votes lost) is smaller (Casas-Arce and Saiz 2011). Our RD strategy exploits 
the presence of close elections, which are by definition very competitive. So there is insufficient variation 
in the sample to test this (and we will tend to under-estimate party bias). However the descriptive statistics 
are consistent with women’s candidacy being greater in more competitive settings.  
26 The voter bias reduction mechanism yields ambiguous results: on the one hand, the ability threshold to 
become a candidate has been lowered for women, but all women now receive more votes. 21 
 
The  increased  candidate  supply  hypothesis  implies  b20>0,  while  reduction  in  party  bias 
implies b20<0. The estimated b20 is negative and statistically significant (Table 5, column 2) 
consistent with a reduction in party bias against women candidates rather than an increase in 
the supply of potential women candidates. This finding resonates with our earlier result that 
a woman winning does not stimulate entry of new women candidates (see Section 4). In the 
next section, we conduct a further test of the candidate supply hypothesis that focuses upon 
the supply of experienced women.  
 
6.3  Does  an  increase  in  the  supply  of  experienced  potential  female  candidates 
matter? 
In general, it is difficult to measure the ability of political candidates (Besley et al, 
2012). In our case, variables such as education, income and other relevant characteristics are 
not available for the full sample of candidates in Indian electoral data and the test presented 
in section 6.2 relies upon vote share as a measure of ability. Here we assess the candidate 
supply mechanism by exploiting a massive shock to the supply of women with political 
experience determined by a constitutional amendment in 1993 that mandated a one-third 
quota for women in district and village level councils.  As in Iyer et al. (2012), we use the 
variation  in  the  incidence  of  this  shock  generated  by  the  fact  that  the  Indian  states 
implemented this mandate in different years (for exogenous reasons). We test whether the 
increase in women’s candidacy following a woman winning a state seat is greater in state 
elections that occur after the more local village and district level quotas for women were put 
in place. To do this we run a difference-in-discontinuities model as follows: 
 
(H3) Femcandist = a + b30*WomanWonis,t-1 + b31*WomanWonis,t-1* PostQuotas+b32 
f(Mis,t-1)       +  b33f(Mis,t-1) * PostQuotas +uist 
 
where PostQuotas is an indicator which equals one if the state has implemented gender 
quotas  in  local  elections,  and  zero  if  it  has  not.  If  the  supply  of  women  with  political 
experience (and connections) were a constraint then we would expect b31>0.  
The  estimated  b31  is  statistically  insignificant  (Table  5,  column  3).  This  result  is 
relevant  because  it  highlights  the  lack  of  “upward  mobility”  in  the  political  sphere,  the 22 
 
implementation of quotas at lower levels does not appear to increase female candidacy at 
higher levels of government.  
 
6.4 Do female winners behave differently from male winners in future elections? 
 Our results so far indicate that the increased candidacy of women is primarily driven by 
women  candidates  that  won  the  previous  election  contesting  again.  We  now  investigate 
whether  this  holds  equally  for  male  winners  by  running  the  following  regression in  the 
mixed-gender elections sample: 
 
(H4) ContestNextEleccist = a + b40*Woncis,t + b41* Woncis,t * Femalecis + b42 f(Mis,t) + 
b43f(Mis,t) * Femalecis +ucist 
where ContestNextEleccist  is a dummy for whether candidate c in constituency i of state s 
and year t is a candidate in the next election, Woncis,t is a dummy variable indicating whether 
candidate c won the mixed-gender race, Femalecis is an indicator for whether the candidate 
is female, and Mis,t is the margin of victory. The coefficient of interest is b41, which captures 
the difference between female and male winners. 
We find that both male and female candidates are equally likely to re-run for election 
after a victory (Table 5, column 4).
27 However, when we examine the probability of running 
for re-election from the same party as a dependent variable, we find a significant gender 
difference. Women winners are more likely to contest the next election from the same party 
as before, compared to male winners (Table 5, column 5), and this effect is not present for 
women who lose the election. We interpret this as supportive evidence that the within-party 
environment has improved for women following an electoral victory.
28 
 
7.  Conclusions 
Using plausibly exogenous variation in women winning political office, we identify a 
large and significant increase in the subsequent share of women candidates fielded by major 
                                                 
27 When running the same specification without the gender interaction we find that winners in mixed-
gender races are 21% more likely than losers to contest the next election. Men who win in close elections 
against  other  men  are  19%  more  likely  to  contest  for  re-election,  an  effect  which  is  not  statistically 
different.  
28 This is not because the woman candidate necessarily improves the party’s prospects. The probability of 
having a woman candidate after a woman’s electoral victory does not vary by whether the electoral victory 
was accompanied by an improvement in the party’s vote share (results available upon request). 23 
 
parties in Indian state elections. The increase arises mainly from an increased propensity for 
previous candidates to run for re-election, rather than the entry of new women candidates. 
Given that a substantial fraction of incumbents in Indian state elections do not re-run and 
female incumbents overall are less likely to re-run than male incumbents, this is an important 
result. There is however no significant increase in the probability that a woman wins the next 
election. Consistent with this, the estimated impact on women’s candidacy fades over time 
although a significant impact persists through two elections, which is a period of ten years. 
There are no significant spillovers to other constituencies in the same district, and no change 
in voter turnout amongst women or men. Testing the implications of a stylized model of 
candidate choice suggests that reduction in party bias against women is the primary driver of 
the  increase  in  women’s  candidacy  following  a  woman’s electoral  victory.  We  find  little 
support for a reduction in voter bias or an increase in the supply of more qualified potential 
candidates.  
Our results show how large and yet how local the power of a good example is. The 
novel and important new finding is that parties appear willing to change their priors with 
regard  to  the  viability  of  women  candidates  after  observing  a  woman  win  an  election. 
However,  we  still  know  very  little  about  internal  party  processes  in  developing  country 
democracies, and how they are likely to react to policy measures such as gender quotas.
29 
Our results also highlight that a “demonstration effect” is not enough: further economic, 
institutional  or  policy  incentives  are  needed  to  stimulate  entry  of  new  women  into  the 
political arena and more widespread participation of women as voters. Both these directions 
are likely to be fruitful areas for future research. 
 
   
                                                 
29 Existing literature on political parties in India has mainly focused on the strategies used to reach out to 
voters, rather than candidate selection processes (Chandra 2004; Thachil 2011). 24 
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A. Gender of winning candidate B. Any criminal charges filed against candidate
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E. Candidate belongs to a major party F. Candidate was the incumbentTable 1
Descriptive Statistics
Whole Sample Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Fraction of female candidates 22478 0.044 0.082 0 0.8
Female share of major party candidates 22420 0.056 0.156 0 1
New female share of major party candidates 22420 0.038 0.129 0 1
Female share of competitive candidates 22478 0.050 0.134 0 1
Female voter turnout 22421 0.587 0.154 0 1
Male voter turnout 22415 0.664 0.124 0.004 1
Woman won previous election (dummy) 22296 0.048 0.214 0 1
Regression Discontinuity Sample Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Fraction of female candidates 1898 0.120 0.124 0 0.8
Female share of major party candidates 1897 0.232 0.252 0 1
New female share of major party candidates 1897 0.054 0.153 0 1
Female share of competitive candidates 1898 0.213 0.217 0 1
Female voter turnout 1896 0.586 0.155 0.010 0.975
Male voter turnout 1895 0.660 0.125 0.011 0.946
Woman won previous election (dummy) 1898 0.528 0.499 0 1Table 2
Women's Electoral Success and Future Political Participation: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Panel A: Main Variables
Fraction of 
female 
candidates
Female share of 
major party 
candidates
Female share of 
competitive 
candidates
New female share 
of major party 
candidates
Female voter 
turnout
Male voter 
turnout
12 3 4 56
Woman won previous election 0.015 0.092 *** 0.063 *** ‐0.014 ‐0.017 ‐0.004
[0.012] [0.022] [0.022] [0.013] [0.015] [0.012]
R‐squared 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.004 0.005
Observations 1898 1897 1898 1897 1896 1895
Polynomial 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order
Total number 
of candidates
# of major party 
candidates
# of female major 
party candidates
# of male major 
party candidates
Woman wins 
next election
78 9 1 011
Woman won previous election ‐1.062 ‐0.033 0.177 *** ‐0.210 ** ‐0.036
[1.465] [0.094] [0.052] [0.096] [0.043]
R‐squared 0.002 0.005 0.09 0.03
Observations 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898
Polynomial 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order
Sample restricted to constituencies where a woman and a man were among the top two vote‐getters in the previous election.
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the state‐election level.
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Panel B: Supplementary VariablesTable 3
Spillovers, Persistence and Robustness
Panel A: Spillovers and Persistence
2nd lag 3rd lag
12 3
Woman won previous election ‐0.003 0.042 * 0.008
[0.007] [0.024] [0.026]
R‐squared 0 0.03 0.01
Observations 1897 1467 1130
polynomial 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order
Panel B: Robustness of RD Results to Changes in Functional Form and Bandwidth
45 6 7 8
Woman won previous election 0.078 *** 0.063 ** 0.0594 ** 0.089 *** 0.087 ***
[0.026] [0.028] [0.026] [0.021] [0.023]
R‐squared 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.17
Observations 1897 1897 932 421 1897
polynomial 3rd order 4rd order linear none 2nd order
bandwidth optimal [0.24] 0.05
State*year fixed effects yes
Sample restricted to constituencies where a woman and a man were among the top two vote‐getters in the previous election.
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the state‐election level.
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Female candidacy 
in rest of district
Persistence
Female share of major party candidatesTable 4: Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Strategy
Panel A: Regression Discontinuity Estimates at "Fake Discontinuity" Points
Coefficient on female winner (dummy) 0.030 ‐0.003 ‐0.051 ‐0.024
[standard error] [0.040] [0.030] [0.037] [0.029]
Fake discontinuity point ‐0.1224 +0.1248 ‐0.1224 +0.1248
Panel B: Regression Discontinuity Effects of Female Electoral Success on Covariates and Pre‐Determined Variables
coefficient standard error coefficient standard error
Demographic covariates
Fraction female 0.001 [0.002] 0 [0.003]
Total literacy rate ‐0.008 [0.015] 0.006 [0.019]
Female literacy rate ‐0.017 [0.018] 0.007 [0.023]
Fraction SC/ST population 0.004 [0.015] ‐0.009 [0.013]
Fraction urban population 0.022 [0.023] 0.052 [0.032]
Outcomes from previous election
Total votes polled ‐1478.312 [1500.219] ‐1807.62 [2007.14]
Male electors ‐2061.794 [3406.182] ‐6819.58 [4272.63]
Female electors ‐1514.283 [2921.579] ‐4356.18 [3231.76]
Number of candidates ‐1.281 [1.669] ‐0.279 [0.893]
Number of female candidates 0.048 [0.079] 0.162 [0.091]
Num female candidates from major parties  0.018 [0.032] 0.097 [0.054]
Male voter turnout ‐0.013 [0.009] ‐0.004 [0.0197]
Female voter turnout ‐0.028 * [0.014] 0.002 [0.024]
Note: the fake discontinuity points are chosen as the median of the observations on the left and the median of the observations on the right of 
the real discontinuity.
Local linear regressions, 
optimal bandwidth
Quadratic polynomial in vote 
margins
Quadratic polynomial in vote 
margins
Local linear regressions, 
optimal bandwidthTable 5
Testing Mechanisms
Party has a 
female 
candidate 
(dummy)
Vote share of 
new major party 
female 
candidates
Female share of 
major party 
candidates
Candidate runs 
for re‐election
Candidate runs for 
re‐election from 
the same party
12 3 4 5
Woman won previous election ‐0.173 *** ‐0.022 ** 0.067 **
[0.024] [0.011] [0.033]
Woman won previous election 0.757 ***
               * incumbent party dummy [0.046]
Incumbent party dummy ‐0.192 ***
[0.030]
Woman won previous election 0.044
               *post‐quota period for local elections [0.045]
Post‐quota period for local elections 0.01
[0.039]
Candidate wins election*female candidate 0.108 0.150 **
[0.075] [0.071]
Candidate wins election 0.153 *** 0.089 *
[0.053] [0.050]
Female candidate ‐0.083 ‐0.005
[0.056] [0.046]
Observations 4852 1898 1897 3374 3374
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the state‐election level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Sample restricted to constituencies where a woman and a man were among the top two vote‐getters in the previous election.
RD estimates computed using a quadratic polynomial control in vote margins and a difference‐in‐discontinuities specification
Regressions are at party‐constituency level in column (1), constituency level in columns (2) and (3), and candidate level in columns (4) and (5). Column (1) restricted 
to major parties only, columns (4) and (5) restricted to winners and runners‐up in mixed‐gender elections.Table A1
Women's Electoral Success and Future Political Participation: OLS Estimates
Female share of 
competitive 
candidates
Fraction female 
candidates
New female 
share of 
major party 
candidates
Female voter 
turnout
Male voter 
turnout
123 4 5 6 7
Woman won previous election 0.110 *** 0.109 *** 0.097 *** 0.041 *** ‐0.083 *** ‐0.003 ‐0.002
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.004] [0.007] [0.003] [0.003]
‐0.004
[0.008]
R‐squared 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.22 0.77 0.72
Observations 22238 22238 22296 22296 22238 22240 22234
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the constituency level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
All regressions control for constituency and election cycle fixed effects, and district specific trends.
Female share of major party 
candidates
Woman was a runner‐up in previous 
electionTable A2
Testing Mechanims: OLS Estimates
Party has a 
female 
candidate 
(dummy)
Vote share of 
new major 
party female 
candidates
Female share of 
major party 
candidates
Candidate runs 
for re‐election
Candidate runs for 
re‐election from 
the same party
123 45
Woman won previous election ‐0.077 *** ‐0.090 *** 0.098 ***
[0.024] [0.006] [0.012]
Woman won previous election 0.540 ***
               * incumbent party dummy [0.046]
Incumbent party dummy ‐0.023 ***
[0.030]
Woman won previous election 0.029
               *post‐quota period for local elections [0.018]
Post‐quota period for local elections 0.012 ***
[0.004]
Candidate wins election*female candidate 0.071 *** 0.054 **
[0.024] [0.023]
Candidate wins election 0.311 *** 0.305 ***
[0.005] [0.005]
Female candidate ‐0.093 *** ‐0.031 *
[0.018] [0.016]
R‐squared 0.21 0.24 0.38 0.26 0.24
Observations 56546 22296 22238 38000 38000
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the constituency level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
All regressions control for constituency and election cycle fixed effects, and district specific trends.
Regressions are at party‐constituency level in column (1), constituency level in columns (2) and (3), and candidate level in columns (4) and (5). Column (1) 
restricted to major parties only.